This paper proposes an empirical hypothesis that in some cases of social interaction we have an immediate perceptual access to others' minds in the perception of their embodied intentionality. Our point of departure is the phenomenological insight that there is an experiential difference in the perception of embodied intentionality and the perception of non-intentionality. The other's embodied intentionality is perceptually given in a way that is different from the givenness of non-intentionality. We claim that the phenomenological difference in the perception (...) of embodied intentionality and non-intentionality translates into an account of how, in some cases of social cognition, we perceive mental properties in the perception of embodied intentionality. The hypothesis derives support from a host of recent empirical studies in social neuroscience which demonstrate the importance of embodied engagements in understanding other minds. These studies reveal that embodied intersubjective interaction often builds on our ability to understand other minds in an immediate perceptual way not adequately investigated by theory-theory (TT) and simulation theories (ST) of mind-reading. We argue that there is a genuine, nontrivial difference in the informational content of the perception of embodied intentionality and the perception of non-intentionality which leads to a further difference in the way information is processed in the case of perception of embodied intentionality as opposed to the perception of non-intentionality. The full significance of such difference is appreciated only within an account of perception which views perception and action as tightly coupled. Thus, we propose an "action-oriented account of social perception" to develop a neurophilosophical account of the perceptual knowledge of other minds. (shrink)

What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to (...) the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis The former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. Exploring one of the major debates in the philosophy and psychology, this book is fascinating reading for all those in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...) out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme. (shrink)

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection using the key metaphors of light and reflective awareness. This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the (...) concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Corruption is of central interest to business ethics but its meaning is often assumed to be self-evident and universal. In this paper we seek to re-politicize and unsettle the dominant meaning of corruption by showing how it is culturally specific, relationally derived and varies over time. In particular, we show how corruption’s meaning changes depending on its relationship with Western-style liberal democracy and non-Western local experience with its implementation. We chose this focus because promoting democracy is a central plank of (...) the international anti-corruption and development agenda and yet the relationship between corruption and democracy is rarely specified. Adopting a critical-discursive approach that draws on poststructuralism and postcolonialism, we explore how the meaning of corruption constructed in The Jakarta Post (TJP) changed in relation to Indonesia’s experience in implementing democratic reform, a condition of the international financial aid it received following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In the 1990s, corruption was seen as an illness, and democracy the cure; from 2000 to 2011 experience with democracy brought disillusion—democracy had not cured corruption but caused it to spread; while from 2012 to 2014 democracy was constructed as a valued end in its own right, but needed protection from corruption in order to survive. From translating the international development agenda in a relatively straightforward way, TJP moved towards constructions of increasing complexity and ambivalence. This demonstrates how corruption’s meaning is fundamentally contingent and unstable—even dominant meanings have the potential to be contested, showing how they are an effect of power and raising the possibility of alternatives. (shrink)

In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...) on the contrary, that the access problem is a genuine problem that must be addressed by any account of social cognition, perceptual or non-perceptual, because we cannot cast the access problem as a false problem without violating certain fundamental intuitions about other minds. We elaborate the fundamental intuitions as three constraints on any theory of social perception: the Immediacy constraint; the Transcendence constraint; and the Accessibility constraint. We conclude with an outline of an account of perceiving other minds that meets the three constraints. (shrink)

This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue (...) is not about defending any philosophical tradition or theoretical stance against all others. It is about understanding some central aspects of the nature of our experience of other people. (shrink)

v. 1. Indian aesthetics.--v. 2. Western aesthetics.

The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due to a tension between the grand coalition and sub-coalitions. We provide a counter-intuitive argument to demonstrate that the Coase theorem may be in complete consonance with bargaining set stability. We establish that an uncertainty concerning the formation of sub-coalitions will explain such compatibility: each agent fears that others may `gang up' against him and this fear forces the agents to negotiate. The grand coalition emerges from the negotiations (...) if each agent uses the principle of equal relative sacrifice to determine the actual allocation. We also establish the rational basis for the choice of the principle of equal relative concession by the negotiating agents. Hence we argue that the Coase theorem will be valid even if there are stable sub-coalitions. (shrink)

Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s classic paper introducing the notion of a ‘theory of mind’ :515–526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory–theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises (...) to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition. (shrink)

Language is always directed to Reality whatever its nature may be. The valuable articles incorporated in this book examine the following questions in particular:? What is relation between Language and Reality??What are different dimensions of Reality? Can all types of Reality be expressed through language??Can the relation between Language and Reality be explained as internal or external??Can meaning of Language be equated with its existence?All the contributors of this Volume have discussed at length, the relation between Language and Reality from (...) the Eastern as well as Western perspectives. This volume is the result of intensive and matured thinking of the scholars working in this field for a longer period of time. (shrink)

Understanding cognitive effort expended during assessments is essential to improving efficiency, accuracy, and accessibility within these assessments. Pupil dilation is commonly used as a psychophysiological measure of cognitive effort, yet research on its relationship with effort expended specifically during language processing is limited. The present study adds to and expands on this literature by investigating the relationships among pupil dilation, trial difficulty, and accuracy during a vocabulary test. Participants (n = 63, Mage = 19.25) completed a subset of trials from (...) the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test while seated at an eye‐tracker monitor. During each trial, four colored images were presented on the monitor while a word was presented via audio recording. Participants verbally indicated which image they thought represented the target word. Words were categorized into Easy, Medium, and Hard difficulty. Pupil dilation during the Medium and Hard trials was significantly greater than during the Easy trials, though the Medium and Hard trials did not significantly differ from each other. Pupil dilation in comparison to trial accuracy presented a more complex pattern, with comparisons between accurate and inaccurate trials differing depending on the timing of the stimulus presentation. These results present further evidence that pupil dilation increases with cognitive effort associated with vocabulary tests, providing insights that could help refine vocabulary assessments and other related tests of language processing. (shrink)

Indian Perspectives on Consciousness, Language and Self by Marco Ferrante explores theories of consciousness by examining the non-dual philosophy of Recognition mainly represented by the two philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, and also carefully concludes that the trajectory of their ideas have compelling influence from Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja. No philosophy ever evolves and develops in a void. No philosophical tradition or theory functions in oblivion. In the history of philosophy in South Asia, this is also true of the traditions (...) that have staunchly stood up and rigorously argued for the ubiquity of consciousness. The dynamism of... (shrink)

In this collection of essays written over thirty years, Miri, drawing on both Western and Indian traditions, provides fresh insight into some fundamental philosophical concerns--morality, modernity, individual and group identity, rationality, and violence in politics.

This book provides an analytical understanding of some of Tagore’s most contested and celebrated works and ideas. It reflects on his critique of nationalism, aesthetic worldview, and the idea of ‘surplus in man’ underlying his life and works. It discusses the creative notion of surplus that stands not for ‘profit’ or ‘value’, but for celebrating human beings’ continuous quest for reaching out beyond one’s limits. It highlights, among other themes, how the idea of being ‘Indian’ involves stages of evolution through (...) a complex matrix of ideals, values and actions—cultural, historical, literary and ideological. Examining the notion of the ‘universal’, contemporary scholars come together in this volume to show how ‘surplus in man’ is generated over the life of concrete particulars through creativity. The work brings forth a social scientific account of Tagore’s thoughts and critically reconstructs many of his epochal ideas. Lucid in analysis and bolstered with historical reflection, this book will be a major intervention in understanding Tagore’s works and its relevance for the contemporary human and social sciences. It will interest scholars and researchers of philosophy, literature and cultural studies. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory (Noe¨, 2004, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noe¨ as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noe¨’s sensorimotor theory they do (...) not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content. (shrink)

This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on ‘Abhinavagupta on Reflection’ appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (_pratibimbavāda_) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (_fl.c._ 975-1025 CE) in the _Tantrāloka_ and his commentator Jayaratha (_fl.c._ 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is (...) simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (_pratibimba_) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (_bimba_) or an illusion (_bhrānti_). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Śaiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky’. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta’s system has generally been referred to as ‘idealism’, I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as ‘dynamic realism’ i.e., the ‘dynamism’ that is common to both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’. This is why he uses the metaphor _consciousness-as-mirror_ (_ciddarpaṇa_) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection. (shrink)

In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...) processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to evaluate the concept of non-duality (_advaita_) in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (_fl. c._ 975–1025 CE), one of the leading exponents of Trika Śaivism, who argues for ‘absolute non-duality’ (_paramādvaita_) as a fundamental principle of everything. According to him, this fundamental meta-category subsumes within itself both ‘duality’ (_dvaita_ or _bheda_) and ‘non-duality’ (_advaita_ or _abheda_) in a resolution that, on the surface, appears to be nothing more than an oxymoron. How can two mutually opposing categories (...) be one? However, for Abhinavagupta, both ‘duality’ and ‘non-duality’ are the basic building blocks of an all-encompassing singular meta-category called ‘absolute non-duality’ (_paramādvaita_). This version of non-duality argues for inclusivism, i.e., for any idea of binary to manifest, someone fundamentally recognises the distinction between, for instance, a ‘pot’ (_ghaṭa_) and a ‘non-pot’ (_aghaṭa_) and it is this distinction (_dvaita_ or _bheda_) that unitarily brings a pot and a non-pot together (_advaita_ or _abheda_). By saying this, Abhinavagupta is not suggesting that a pot is a non-pot and a non-pot is a pot. But they are singular manifestations in a plural form _of_ and _in_ a singular principle, i.e., non-dual consciousness (_advaitasamvit_). Using a more contemporary terminology, this form of non-duality may be called ‘pluralistic non-dualism’ or ‘subjective pluralism’, understood in the sense that even two mutually opposing labels, such as ‘pluralistic idealism’ or ‘idealistic realism’, can be used. (shrink)

The book highlights the concept of ontology, relationship between language and ontology, the distinction between ontology and reality, the role of linguistic philosophers in dealing with ontology etc. Apart from these, the eminent scholars address themselves with the ontology behind the value of valuation, exclusion and discrimination, inter-religious dialogue, Indian theories of language, values in cinema, poetic language etc.

The western philosophical tradition has been abidingly occupied with the duality of the mind and the body. The soul is substantially the same as the mind for this tradition. In the Indian tradition, however, there is no duality between the mind and the body. The mind is an organ of the body, and I-consciousness is nothing but the ego which is a construct of the mind. For Gandhi, the human body is central to the articulation of the moral life. Concepts (...) like brahmacharya, sacrifice, fearlessness, moral purity would not make sense if the body was not crucially involved in imagining the life of morality. Action is firmly in the domain of the body. The soul is atman and is not involved in action at all. Moral authority derives from Truth conceived as God. Modern politics is deeply involved in the ideality (future) of political action, and, as such, cannot extricate itself from the notion of the instrumentality of the ethical. Gandhi is firmly opposed to this idea, and many of his criticisms of modern civility follow from this. (shrink)

The influence of Christianity on Western moral philosophy is unmistakable. The enlightenment certainly made a difference. But Reason replaced God, morality retained its universality and became secular. The dharma tradition is firmly grounded in practical reality, and while universality has a place in it, its focus is on particularity and contextual specificity. Gandhi was firmly rooted in the Indian tradition and derived his inspiration primarily from the Gita. Some of the central Gandhian ideas on morality are: truth, ahimsa, satyagraha, sacrifice, (...) and the virtues free of any instrumentality. Gandhi also believed that animals are a significant part of the domain of morality. Although animals may not perhaps have language, they certainly have an inner life which makes them unmistakably the proper subject of moral attention. (shrink)

This book examines the centrality of ideas such as satya (truth), ahimsa (non-violence), humility, and respect for understanding moral life in the complex milieu of human existence. It provides a comprehensive view of how Gandhian ideas have both a temporal and spatial universality significantly different from Western modern philosophy's universality claims. The chapters represent different styles of philosophy but with a common purpose, offering insights into how the global debates on religion, morality, and politics are assessed from Gandhi's point of (...) view. Written in language accessible to general readers with an interest in Gandhian thinking, the book will appeal to academics and philosophers. (shrink)

Liberal politics relegates religion to the sphere of the private. The public world is secular. “Privacy”, however, cannot imply “private to a person”; it must mean “private to a community”. Religion must be public at least within the community. Spiritual experience, part of most religions, though private in an acceptable sense, is something that takes place within the trappings of a religious culture, sustained by the religious community. The only criterion of the authenticity of a spiritual experience is its moral (...) manifestation. Gandhi’s “Truth is God”, taken with the seriousness that he intended, yields interesting consequences about (i) the concept of truth and truthfulness, (ii) the distinction between religion and religious culture, and (iii) “equality” of all religions and, most importantly, religious conversion. Religious conversion, as Gandhi believed, is neither necessary nor possible. (shrink)

The book consists of six chapters—three by Bindu Puri and the other three by me. Our styles are different—the result perhaps of the different kinds of training we had received as students. But our interests coincide and frequently our arguments: Puri’s arguments clothed in the rich narrative style where the philosophy unmistakably shines through and mine somewhat skeletally just philosophical.

The book brings philosophical considerations to bear upon our understanding of the concept of education and concepts related to it. It seeks to answer questions such as: is education a unitary concept, or is it a cluster of concepts which are more or less related to one another? Are there values which are constitutive of the practice of education? Is moral education an independent variety of education, or is it necessary internal to all educational practice?

Saiva Philosophy is an outgrowth of the religion characterized by the worship of the phallic form of God siva. Saivasm as a religion has persisted since the pre-historic time of the archaeological finds of Harappa and Mohenjodaro. It has a continuous history of at least five thousand years. It is a living faith praciced all over India. AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF SAIVA PHILOSOPHY first appeared as part of Volume III of Bhaskari in 1954 in the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan (...) Texts Series. The work is now reprinted as an independent volume to meet an increasing demand of the interested readers and scholars. (shrink)

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, (...) even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim the prospective structural continuity from early and simple actions to later complex projects of serially-ordered actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of content–directedness that is a driver for learning and development. Its implications for understanding autism are discussed. (shrink)